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BETWEEN A LOC AND A HARD PLACE: A SOCIO-
HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF HAIR DISCRIMINATION AND TITLE VII 
DENA ELIZABETH ROBINSON*  
TYRA ROBINSON**  
Every year, Black people, including children, are reminded that 
they are inferior when they are turned away from jobs, have offers of 
employment rescinded, or are humiliated in front of family and friends 
due to the way their hair naturally grows out of their heads. When Black 
people bring claims of hair discrimination under Title VII, which are 
often intersectional claims, courts have created legal demarcations to 
separate afros from braids, locs, and twists. 
We argue that grooming codes and hair bans must be situated 
in their socio-historical context for courts to truly understand how dis-
criminating against someone on the basis of whether they are wearing 
braids, locs, or twists constitutes race discrimination under Title VII. 
Additionally, we argue that courts, which played a significant role in 
the legal and social development of race, should take an intersectional, 
socio-historical approach to analyzing grooming codes discrimination.  
Part I discusses Title VII jurisprudence, including the “legal fic-
tion” of immutability or the idea that racial characteristics are an “ac-
cident of birth.” Part II addresses the socio-historical and legal con-
struction of what we now consider to be race, including the roots of 
white supremacy, the racialization of white people and the rampant 
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anti-Blackness that led to whiteness being considered the norm for all 
of humanity. Part III argues that this country’s socio-historical devel-
opment of race and whiteness impacts how our society views Black hair. 
It also discusses the seminal hair discrimination case of Rogers v. Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc., to illustrate the nuances of intersectional, race-based 
hair discrimination claims and how the courts continue to perpetuate 
white supremacy as they fail to truly reckon with race. Finally, Part IV 
outlines potential solutions to the courts failure to reckon with race, in-
cluding taking a cue from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bos-
tock v. Clayton County.  
INTRODUCTION 
“The Past Isn’t Dead. It Isn’t Even Past.” - Faulkner  
Imagine walking into a job interview and being told that if you 
did not cut off your hair, your offer of employment would be rescinded.1 
Or, imagine, that you are in front of your friends and family getting 
ready to participate in a sporting event, and you are told you must cut 
off your hair in order to play.2 This is a common occurrence for Black 
people across the United States and around the world.3 Since the incep-
tion of slavery, the United States’ original sin, Black people, specifically 
Black women, have had to risk losing opportunities like their jobs4 and 
 
1 Chanté Griffin, How Natural Black Hair at Work Became a Civil Rights Issue, JSTOR DAILY 
(Jul. 3, 2019), https://daily.jstor.org/how-natural-black-hair-at-work-became-a-civil-rights-is-
sue (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
2 Michael Gold & Jeffery C. Mays, Civil Rights Investigation Opened After Black Wrestler Had 
to Cut His Dreadlocks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2018, at A20. 
3 See Jameelah Nasheed, Jamaica’s High Court Gives Kingston School Right to Ban Locs, TEEN 
VOGUE (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/jamaica-high-court-kingston-school-
locs-ban. Jamaica is the birthplace of Rastafarianism and the popularization of “dreadlocks,” 
“locks,” or “locs.” Id. Bans of locs in Jamaica, a majority-Black culture, show the breadth of 
anti-Blackness and how white supremacy has warped standards of what is considered beautiful. 
Id. 
4 Christy Zhou Koval & Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, The Natural Hair Bias in Job Recruitment, 
SOC. PSYCHOL. AND PERSONALITY SCI. (Aug. 2020), https://jour-
nals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1948550620937937.   
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education5 because of their hair. Additionally, Black women have suf-
fered damage to their financial stability6 and their health and wellbeing7 
due to being forced to kowtow to Eurocentric norms about profession-
alism and beauty. This article explores the social, cultural, historical, 
and legal implications of hair discrimination, and offers solutions for 
how the courts, namely the Supreme Court, can provide Black women 
with a legal remedy under Title VII. 
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE AND 
IMMUTABILITY  
It is impossible to have a conversation about the state of Title 
VII jurisprudence as it relates to hair discrimination without first con-
fronting race and white supremacy. Our legal system, including Title 
VII, are often ineffective remedies for addressing racial discrimination 
because our system is operating exactly as designed. That is, our current 
legal framework, indeed our entire society, operates to consistently per-
petuate whiteness, including white people, white beauty, and white 
standards, as the norm. We see this reproduced across institutions and 
coded as “professional” or “businesslike,” especially in the workplace.8 
Part I provides a brief overview of Title VII jurisprudence and the im-
mutability doctrine.  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of the protected characteris-
 
5 See Janelle Griffith, When Hair Breaks Rules: Some Black Children Are Getting in Trouble 
for Natural Hairstyles, NBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2019, 4:47 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/when-hair-breaks-rules-some-black-children-are-get-
ting-trouble-n973346 (describing a schoolgirl who was sent home at the beginning of the school 
year for wearing braids) (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).  
6 See Emma Axelrod, The Effect of “Beauty” Standards in Professional America, BROWN POL. 
REV. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/11/the-effect-of-beauty-stan-
dards-in-professional-america (discussing a woman who was told she could have a successful 
career in broadcast news if she straightened her braided hair. The woman ended up changing 
majors and her career path).  
7 See Areva Martin, The Hatred of Black Hair Goes Beyond Ignorance, TIME (Aug. 23, 2017, 
4:01 PM), https://time.com/4909898/black-hair-discrimination-ignorance/ (detailing The Good 
Hair Study, which found that Black women feel more anxiety about their hair compared to white 
women) (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
8 See Aysa Gray, The Bias of ‘Professionalism’ Standards, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jun. 
4, 2019), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_bias_of_professionalism_standards (discussing how 
the institutionalized centering of whiteness impacts white and Western standards of dress and 
hairstyle). 
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tics of race, national origin, religion, and sex (including sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity).9 Under Title VII, a plaintiff may bring a dis-
parate treatment or disparate impact claim.10 To bring a disparate treat-
ment claim, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination.11 This can 
be achieved through the use of direct or circumstantial evidence.12 If a 
plaintiff seeks to use circumstantial evidence, they must provide a prima 
facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. 
Green13 burden shifting framework.14 Under that framework and in the 
context of grooming discrimination claims, a plaintiff must prove that 
they are Black, that they were qualified for a position or were adequately 
performing that position, that they suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion (e.g., termination), and that they were treated less favorably than 
others outside of their group or because of intentional discrimination.15 
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their hair 
policy.16 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to provide direct or indi-
rect evidence of pretext or falsity.17  
Disparate impact claims may be more successful for plaintiffs 
seeking redress for hair discrimination. To bring a successful disparate 
impact claim, a plaintiff must show that a policy had an undue burden 
on them due to their race.18 Disparate impact claims reach policies that 
are fair or neutral in form, but are discriminatory in practice. 19  To 
demonstrate a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must prove a prima 
facie case of discrimination, tying discrimination to the reason for their 
termination.20 To do so, a plaintiff may provide general population fig-
ures or statistical evidence showing that there was a substantial disparity 
 
9 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971) (“The objective of Congress in the 
enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees.”). 
10 Dawn Bennett-Alexander & Linda Harrison, My Hair Is Not Like Yours: Workplace Hair 
Grooming Policies for African American Women as Racial Stereotyping in Violation of Title 
VII, 22 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 437, 441 (2016). 
11 Venessa Simpson, What’s Going On Hair?: Untangling Societal Misconceptions That Stop 
Braids, Twists, and Dreads From Receiving Deserved Title VII Protection, 47 SW. L. REV. 265, 
278 (2017). 
12 Id. 
13 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
14 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 279. 
15 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 279. 
16 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 281. 
17 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 279. 
18 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 282. 
19 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
20 Simpson, supra note 11, at 283. 
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between them and other persons.21 Scholars have argued that claims ad-
vancing theories that Black hairstyles are immutable not because of cul-
ture, but because of the basic biology of Black hair, could be successful 
as a disparate impact suit.22 Once a plaintiff has made such a showing, 
the burden shifts to the employer to provide that the policy was job re-
lated and a business necessity.23 The burden then shifts back to the plain-
tiff to provide that other employment options would serve the em-
ployer’s interest without creating undesirable discriminatory effects.24  
Because racial discrimination in the workplace did not disappear 
after Congress passed Title VII, courts added an immutability standard 
to Title VII claims for employment discrimination.25 Under this stand-
ard, Title VII only protects characteristics an employee cannot change.26 
Courts have used the immutability standard to find that Black hairstyles 
like twists, braids, and locs are mutable.27 Curiously, these same courts 
have consistently found that afros, another traditionally Black hairstyle, 
are not.28 The inherent difference between the two, according to the 
courts, is that twists, braids, and locs can be changed to comply with an 
employer’s policy.29 A Black person could opt to wear a wig, a hair-
piece, relax their hair, or cut their hair off.30 Conversely, a Black person 
could wear an afro as it is “the product of natural hair growth.”31 The 
immutability standard is premised on the idea that race is a biological, 
fixed characteristic.32 However, research indicates that it is not.33 Sec-
tion II outlines the social, legal, and historical construction of race to 
shed light on what race is and is not.34  
 
21 Simpson, supra note 11, at 283–84. 
22 Simpson, supra note 11, at 280–81. 
23 Simpson, supra note 11, at 283. 
24 Simpson, supra note 11, at 283. 
25 See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1028–30 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying 
the mutable characteristic standard). 
26 See id. at 1032.  
27 Id. at 1030; see also id. at 1035 (holding that an employer did not discriminate against a job 
applicant when it refused to hire her because she would not cut off her locs); Rogers v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a grooming policy that pro-
hibited braided hairstyles was not racially discriminatory because braids are a mutable charac-
teristic). 
28 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (finding that afros are closer to an immutable characteristic). 
29 Id. 
30 Simpson, supra note 11, at 287. 
31 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (noting that banning a natural hairstyle would violate discri-
mination policies).  
32 Sharona Hoffman, Is there a Place for “Race” as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093, 
1096 (2004). 
33 Id. at 1122. 
34 See infra Section II. 
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II. WHAT’S RACE GOT TO DO WITH IT? THE SOCIAL AND 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
What is race? In jumping through hoops to define mutable and 
immutable racial characteristics, courts have struggled to answer this 
question. Indeed, this question has stumped legal institutions for almost 
500 + years.35 Perhaps that is because no one has a clear definition for 
race. How could we when race was legally and socially created?36 At its 
core, hair discrimination is rooted in white supremacist ideals about 
what bodies are beautiful.37 Hair discrimination is reinforced by a sys-
tem that prioritizes the skin, hair, and bodies of people who have been 
racialized as white over those who have been racialized as Black.38 To 
understand hair discrimination and the immutability standard, one must 
first accurately define “race.”  
Dr. Maulana Karenga defines race as “an arbitrary socio/biolog-
ical classification created by Europeans during the time of worldwide 
colonial expansion, to assign human worth and social status using them-
selves as the model of humanity, for the purpose of legitimizing white 
power and white skin privilege.”39 David Gillborn, a researcher known 
for his work in critical race theory defines white supremacy as a “ polit-
ical, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly 
control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas 
of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of 
white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted 
across a broad array of institutions and social settings.”40 Race and white 
supremacy have led us to a place where Black hair, in its loc’d, afro’d, 
 
35 See generally Hoffman, supra note 32, at 1113–36 (explaining the varying defini tions of 
race across various institutions). 
36 Hoffman, supra note 32, at 1101. 
37 Crystal Powell, Bias, Employment Discrimination, and Black Women’s Hair: Another Way 
Forward, 2018 BYU L. REV. 933, 936 (2019) (“In most societies a woman’s hair is her beauty; 
and its absence becomes her ugliness. Slavery made the Black woman’s hair ugly[.]”).  
38 Teresa J. Guess, The Social Construction of Whiteness: Racism by Intent, Racism by Con-
sequence, 32(4) CRITICAL SOCIO. 649, 660 (2006). 
39 Understanding & Dismantling Racism: MCARI Anti-Racism Workshop, https://www.ram-
seycounty.us/sites/default/files/Assistance%20and%20Support/Syste-
mic%20Power%20Race.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2020). The authors want to acknowledge that 
Dr. Karenga is a controversial figure; he was convicted and served time for the felonious assault 
and false imprisonment of a Black woman. Kirsten West Savali, Kwanzaa: Revisiting Maulana 
Karenga’s Legacy, THE ROOT (Dec. 28, 2017 9:00AM), https://www.theroot.com/kwanzaa-re-
visiting-maulana-karenga-s-legacy-1821579446. While we decry that act of violence against a 
Black woman’s body, this is the most accurate definition of race we have found. 
40 Vann R. Newkirk II, The Language of White Supremacy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/the-language-of-white-suprem-
acy/542148/. 
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and braided glory, has been written off as unprofessional, ugly, and un-
natural.41 This Section discusses this country’s history of race, racism, 
and white supremacy, its roots in anti-Blackness, and its cultural and 
societal implications.   
A. Whiteness 
The “rules” of racial assignment and whiteness began percolat-
ing in this country long before enslaved Africans arrived.42 Before slave 
traders brought enslaved Africans to Turtle Island, this land was, and 
indeed still is, inhabited   indigenous peoples.43 Among them was Poca-
hontas.44 Though many of us first learned of Pocahontas through Dis-
ney’s Pocahontas, her real life was much more disturbing. In 1614, Po-
cahontas married Tobacco tycoon John Rolfe.45 This marriage was not 
one of love, but of politics and power.46 The marriage was a political 
alliance between Rolfe and Pocahontas’ father, Chief Powhatan. 47 
While John Rolfe died a rich man,48 Pocahontas, later baptized as Re-
becca Rolfe, did not.49 Unfortunately, Pocahontas died in England, sep-
arated from her family, in her early 20s.50 However, before her death, 
she gave birth to a son, Thomas.51 The “rules” around race, racial as-
 
41 See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156, 1159 (11th Cir. 2016) opinion with-
drawn and superseded, 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016) (discussing that an employer would not 
employee who had dreadlocks because they are “messy”). 
42 See IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING 22 (Bold Type Books, 1st ed. 2020) 
(“Richard Mather and John Cotton inherited from the English thinkers of their generation the 
old racist ideas that African slavery was natural and normal and holy. These racist ideas were 
nearly two centuries old when Puritans used them in the 1630s to legalize and codify New Eng-
land slavery[.]”). 
43 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States 1492-Present 13 (2001) (“When the 
Pilgrims came to New England they too were coming not to vacant land but to territory inhabited 
by tribes of [Native Americans]”).  
44 History.com Editors, Pocahontas, HISTORY (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.history.com/top-
ics/native-american-history/pocahontas.  
45 This Day in History: Pocahontas marries John Rolfe, HISTORY, (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/pocahontas-marries-john-rolfe. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, The Full Story of Pocahontas Is Rarely Told. Here’s What We’re 
Missing, TIME (Mar. 12, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://time.com/5548379/pocahontas-real-meaning/ 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
49 See History.com Editors, supra note 44 (describing that after Pocahontas died, her son, 
Thomas Wolfe, claimed his father’ and grandfather's inheritances and became a successful to-
bacco farmer).  
50 See History.com Editors, supra note 44. 
51 See History.com Editors, supra note 44. 
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signment, and white supremacy begin here because it is essential to un-
derstand the arbitrariness of race, racial assignment, and power alloca-
tion.  
In 1640, years after the first enslaved Africans were brought to 
the United States, but before the American institution of slavery was 
born, three indentured servants, a Scotsman, a Dutchman, and an Afri-
can named John Punch, ran away together.52 The three ended up getting 
caught.53 When they did, the Scotsman and the Dutchman had four years 
added to their time.54 John Punch, the Black man, received the sentence 
of perpetual servitude, thereby sentencing him to enslavement for life.55 
This represented the codification of slavery on the basis of racial phe-
notype.  
John Punch’s story would not be the first or last time that Blacks 
and poor whites engaged in organizing. In the 1670s, between 1676 to 
1677, farmers of multiple classes, poor Black indentured servants, and 
slaves banded together with Nathaniel Bacon in a cross-racial, cross-
class uprising against Virginia’s Governor William Berkeley.56 The up-
rising was swiftly crushed and the Virginia House of Burgesses cracked 
down on future uprisings via the Virginia Slave Codes.57 Under the Vir-
ginia Slave Codes, a master had the right to correct a slave and would 
not be punished if the slave died.58 The Codes encouraged free white 
people to hunt down Africans who had escaped slavery and to even cap-
ture free Blacks.59 White men or women who married people of African 
or indigenous descent would be committed to jail and pay a fine.60 The 
Slave Codes effectively ended any hopes at cross-racial organizing in 
the Virginia colony.  
Virginia continued to create a color divide. In 1682, the Virginia 
House of Burgesses, the first legislative body in the new colonies, 
passed a law limiting citizenship to Europeans.61 All those who were not 
 
52 Scene on Radio, Seeing White: Made in America (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.sceneonra-
dio.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/SeeingWhite_Part3Transcript.pdf. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. While this represented a cross-racial, cross-class uprising, the authors would be remiss to 
note that Nathaniel Bacon wanted the uprising to serve as an impetus for attacking indigenous 
people. Id. 
57 Id.  
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European at the time, including Black people, Moors, mixed-race indi-
viduals, and indigenous people were “slaves to all intents and pur-
poses.”62 The House of Burgesses needed such a law because it was giv-
ing away land in 50-acre allotments to Europeans.63 In 1691, the House 
of Burgesses passed another law that declared “[w]hatsoever English or 
other white man or woman, being free, shall intermarry with a negro, 
mullato, or Indian man or woman, bond or free, shall within three 
months after marriage be banished and removed from this dominion for-
ever.”64 This was the first documented use of the term “white” to de-
scribe full citizens.  
About one hundred years later, in 1790, this country conducted 
its first census.65 According to Nell Irvin Painter, this first U.S. census 
“counted people in these categories: white males 16 years and older, 
white males under 16, white females, all other free persons, and slaves. 
Remember, enslaved people were counted as 3/5 of a person for pur-
poses of taxation and representation in Congress.”66 In other words, be-
ing an American citizen meant being a white person.67 That same year, 
our first Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790, which said that 
only free white persons could be naturalized as citizens.68  
These vignettes display a number of lessons. First, race, specif-
ically whiteness, was socially and legally constructed. Second, the legal 
and social construction of race was meant to consolidate and maintain 
access to power, regardless of whether that power was land, money, or 
the ability to vote. On the flip side of the construction of whiteness was 
the entrenchment of pervasive anti-Blackness throughout the country.69 
B. The Roots of Racialization and anti-Blackness 
For whiteness and race to truly “stick,” there had to be a group 




64 Scene on Radio, Seeing White: Made in America (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.sceneonra-
dio.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/SeeingWhite_Part3Transcript.pdf. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Nick J. Sciullo, Richard Sherman, Rhetoric, and Racial Animus in the Rebirth of the Bogey-
man Myth, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 201, 212 (2014–2015) (“[W]hiteness sustains itself 
by anti-blackness in law, from employment discrimination to constitutional law to criminal law, 
then, legal actors are otherizing blackness not simply to demean a racial group, but instead of 
construct and sustain whiteness.”).  
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way to separate poor or indentured whites from poor, indentured, or en-
slaved Blacks.70 The roots of anti-Black sentiment developed long be-
fore colonizers reached Turtle Island.71 According to Ibram Kendi, as 
Puritans studied the ideas of Aristotle, they began to internalize a racial 
hierarchy. 72  Aristotle himself had labeled African people as having 
“burnt skin,” which was the original meaning of the term “Ethiopian” 
in Greek.73 Kendi argues that although ethnic, religious, and color prej-
udice existed in the ancient world, the construction of race did not, 
therefore racist ideas and racism did not yet exist.74 However, the foun-
dations for what we now consider to be racial prejudice was laid.75  
Travelers to Africa depicted Africans as being “submissive to 
slavery,” because they were subhuman and “possess[ed] attributes that 
[were] quite similar to those of dumb animals.”76 The scientific belief of 
the time was that if Negroes or Black people migrated to the cooler 
north, their skin would eventually turn white because they could physi-
cally assimilate to colder climates.77 Thus, physically inferior Black 
people could adopt white skin and straight hair.78 
Religious justifications for slavery were also developing at this 
time. Specifically, there was a theory, derived from Genesis 9:18-29, 
that Black people were the descendants of Ham.79 The theory, thus, ar-
gued that Ham’s color and slavery was the direct consequence of this 
curse.80 The Portuguese ended up being the first Europeans to sail across 
the Atlantic to bring enslaved Africans back to Europe.81 At the time, 
many of the captives being sold in Western Europe were actually East-
ern Europeans of Slavic origin.82 Hence, the term “Slavs,” or “slaves.”83 
However, as the market began to change and the captivity of Africans 
was increasing, “Western Europeans began to see the natural Slav(e) not 
 
70 Scene on Radio, supra note 52. 
71 Turtle Island is the indigenous name for the lands we now know as North and Central Amer-
ica. Steven Newcomb, ‘Canada’ and the ‘United States’ Are in Turtle Island, Indian Country 
Today (Sept. 30, 2011), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/canada-and-the-united-states-
are-in-turtle-island-BuMvxVSitEG766jBQ2WplA. 
72 KENDI, supra note 42, at 16 
73 KENDI, supra note 42, at 16–17. 
74 KENDI, supra note 42, at 17. 
75 KENDI, supra note 42, at 17. 
76 KENDI, supra note 42, at 20. 
77 KENDI, supra note 42, at 20. 
78 KENDI, supra note 42, at 20 n.9. 
79 KENDI, supra note 42, at 21. 
80 KENDI, supra note 42, at 21. 
81 KENDI, supra note 42, at 22. 
82 KENDI, supra note 42, at 23. 
83 KENDI, supra note 42, at 23. 
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as White, but Black.”84 In Portugal, these African captives were re-
garded as having “lived like beasts, without any custom of reasonable 
beings[.]”85   
When Spanish colonists arrived in the “New World,” they were 
armed with racist ideas about Blackness. Upon their arrival, Spanish 
colonists would call indigenous people negros de terra or “Blacks from 
the land.”86 Newcomers to the United States believed that Black people 
were inherently cursed because they “were naturally and permanently 
inferior, and totally incapable of becoming White.”87 This sentiment ex-
tended to when white colonizers arrived on Africa’s shores and would 
cut the hair off those they would later enslave.88  Given that the seeds of 
racialization were slowly being planted, by the time John Cotton was 
drafting New England’s first constitution in 1636, he was legalizing the 
enslavement of people.89 Kendi also notes that this sentiment of perpet-
ual enslavement had reached British colonies including Barbados.90 
There, Bajan officials announced that “Negroes and Indians that come 
here to be sold, should serve for Life, unless a Contract was before made 
to the contrary.”91 
Briefly, it is important to acknowledge the devastating toll this 
had on enslaved Africans and the havoc it continues to wreak on their 
descendants. Between the 1500s and the 1860s, some scholars estimate 
that slave traders captured between ten to fifteen million Africans.92 Be-
tween the time of capture and the Middle Passage, about ten to twenty 
percent of those captured died due to the process of being broken, tor-
tured, and “seasoned.”93 When enslaved African women had children, 
they were required to continue picking cotton, and often half of their 
 
84 KENDI, supra note 42, at 23 n.23. 
85 KENDI, supra note 42, at 23 n.5. 
86 KENDI, supra note 42, at 25. 
87 KENDI, supra note 42, at 31. 
88 Brenda A. Randle, I Am Not My Hair: African American Women And Their Struggles With 
Embracing Natural Hair!, 22 RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS J. 114, 117 (2015). 
89 KENDI, supra note 42, at 18. 
90 KENDI, supra note 42, at 18 (“In 1636, Barbados officials announced that ‘Negroes and In-
dians that come here to be sold should serve for Life, unless a Contract was before made to the 
contrary.’”). 
91 KENDI, supra note 42, at 18 (emphasis in original) (quoting ALDEN T. VAUGHN, ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN RACISM: ESSAYS ON THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 157 (N.Y. Oxford Univ. Press 
1995)). 
92 Documenting Slave Voyages, EMORY UNIV. (2018), https://slavevoyages.org/voyage/data-
base#tables (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
93 The Middle Passage, PBS (1999), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia /part1/1p277 .html. 
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babies died in their first year of life.94 By the time of the Civil War in 
1863, there were four million enslaved Africans living in the United 
States.95 During the mid-19th century, more than half of the babies of 
the four million enslaved Black people had died.96 The American insti-
tution of slavery had been in effect for over two hundred years meaning 
that a majority of those enslaved had been born into slavery.97 This is a 
hard history to write and accept, but it is a necessary foundation for dis-
cussing the roots of anti-Blackness and hair discrimination.  
For many enslaved Africans, hair connected them to the cultures 
and lands they had been ripped from,98 but living in a white supremacist 
society meant their hair was used against them.99 The degradation and 
dehumanization of enslaved Africans continued once they reached this 
country’s shores, extending down to their hair. In early racial trials, as 
this country sought to divide power and constantly shift what was con-
sidered white, hair was used as a proxy for race.100 In 1806, a Virginia 
court declared that even if one’s skin was light or white, a person’s hair 
 
94 Steven Mintz, Historical Context: Facts about the Slave Trade and Slavery, THE GILDER 
LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/teaching-re-
source/historical-context-facts-about-slave-trade-and-slavery (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
95 Stanley B. Burns, Behind the Lens: A History in Pictures: Slavery and the Civil War, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/mercy-street/uncover-history/behind-lens/slavery-civil-war/ (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2021).  
96 Deidre Cooper Owens and Sharla M. Fett, Black Maternal Health: Historical Legacies of 
Slavery, 109 AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N. 1342, 1343 (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6727302/pdf/AJPH.2019.305243.pdf. 
97 Steven Mintz, Historical Context: Facts about the Slave Trade and Slavery, THE GILDER 
LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/teaching-re-
source/historical-context-facts-about-slave-trade-and-slavery (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (“U.S. 
slaves where more generations removed from Africa than those in the Caribbean. In the nine-
teenth century, the majority of slaves in the British Caribbean and Brazil were born in Africa. 
In contrast, by 1850, most US slaves were third-, fourth-, or fifth generation Americans.”).  
98 Martin Childs IV, Comment: Who Told You Your Hair Was Nappy?: A Proposal For Re-
placing An Ineffective Standard for Determining Racially Discriminatory Employment Prac-
tices, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 287, 302 (2019) (“[T]he significance of African-American hair 
can be traced back to Africa, where hairstyles were not worn solely for the purpose of beauty. 
Africans wore these hairstyles to identify each other’s tribe, religion, or village. Africans also 
wore these hairstyles to signify when someone was going to war or to show that someone was 
in mourning.”). 
99 See id. at 303–04 (detailing how enslavement was used to strip enslaved Africans of their 
identity via their hair). 
100 See Anna-Lisa F. Macon, Comment: Hair’s The Thing: Trait Discrimination and Forced 
Performance of Race Through Racially Conscious Public School Hairstyle Prohibitions, 17 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1255, 1280 (2015) (“[H]air texture and hairstyle function as a fundamen-
tal proxy for race. ‘Hair texture [and hairstyle are] sought out as a proxy for the visual cues 
associated with race as a way to determine the terms, limits, and boundaries of social interac-
tions.’”) (quoting Osagie K. Obasogie, Can the Blind Lead the Blind? Rethinking Equal Protec-
tion Jurisprudence Through an Empirical Examination of Blind People’s Understanding of 
Race, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 705, 751 (2013)).  
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texture was dispositive in determining their race.101 When enslaved Af-
ricans fled slavery, their hairstyles were used as descriptors.102 For ex-
ample, a slave owner would cut an enslaved African’s hair in an irregu-
lar manner as a punishment for fleeing her enslavement.103 Hair was 
used as a vehicle to control Black bodies.   
 
After Abraham Lincoln “freed the slaves,” Black people were 
far from free.104 Almost immediately after the Emancipation Proclama-
tion abolished slavery for all people except those convicted of a crime, 
“black codes” emerged to criminalize and police Black bodies.105 These 
“black codes” included laws that criminalized loitering, breaking cur-
few, being unemployed, walking near railroad tracks, and talking too 
loudly in the presence of white women.106  
In 1954, the Supreme Court held that separate but equal was in-
herently unequal in Brown v. Board of Education I.107 There, the Court 
relied on the “doll test[s]” conducted by Black psychologists, Kenneth 
and Mamie Clark, during a 1940s tour of segregated Black American 
schools.108 As many scholars noted, the Court’s reliance on this social 
science research focused entirely on the ways in which Black children 
 
101 D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (And Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got To 
Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1366 (2008). 
102 Barbara J. Heath, Buttons, Beads, and Buckles: Contextualizing Adornment Within the 
Bounds of Slavery, in HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, IDENTITY FORMATION, AND THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF ETHNICITY 47 (Maria Franklin & Garrett Fesler eds., 1999). 
103 Id. at 55. 
104 See ZINN, supra note 43, at 197–99 (detailing how because property confiscated during the 
war reverted back to the heirs of Confederate owners, many Southern states enacted “Black 
codes,” which “made the free slaves like serfs.”). 
105 See Shayna Watson, Black Codes and Dress Codes: Will Black Hair Always Be Against the 
Rules?, THE ROOT (May 28, 2017, 9:03 AM), https://www.theroot.com/black-codes-and-dress-
codes-will-black-hair-always-be-1795599759. 
106 See Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegem-
ony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 Yale L.J. 2249, 2257–63 (1998) (discussing the history 
of Black Codes and their continuing legacy through vagrancy and other laws). 
107 347 U.S. 483, 692 (1954). 
108 Leila McNeill, How a Psychologist’s Work on Race Identity Helped Overturn School Seg-
regation in 1950s America, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.smithson-
ianmag.com/science-nature/psychologist-work-racial-identity-helped-overturn-school-segre-
gation-180966934/.  
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had internalized their inferiority, also known as internalized racial op-
pression.109 The Court had an opportunity to center whiteness, white su-
premacy, and white violence, but instead chose silence.110 In doing so, 
the Court began to entrench the idea of race neutrality and immutability 
into civil rights law, which has played into white supremacy’s hand and 
dug us into a hole so deep we cannot keep up.  
In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Housing Act.111 The fed-
eral government adopted these manuals and practices and channeled 
funds to white neighborhoods.112 Specifically, the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation (HOLC) created color-coded maps that designated which 
areas were safe to insure mortgages.113 Anywhere that Black people 
lived or were close to were marked “red,” making them too risky to in-
sure.114 The Underwriting Manual of the Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) recommended that highways were a good way to separate 
Black neighborhoods from white neighborhoods.115 Again, Black peo-
ple, many of whom were the descendants of enslaved Africans, were 
marked as dangerous.  
In the 1930s, President Roosevelt enacted the New Deal pro-
grams, including the Social Security Act.116 President Roosevelt’s New 
Deal made $120 billion (now approximately $1 trillion) in loans avail-
able.117 About ninety-eight percent of those loans went to people who 
 
109 Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Sup-
reme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 801–02, n.33 (2002).   
110 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Article: Reconceptualizing The Harms Of Discrimination: How 
Brown v. Board of Education Helped to Further White Supremacy, 105 VA. L. REV. 343, 355 
(2019) (arguing that the Brown Court “completely failed to even name, much less recognize, 
the material benefits that had come to Whites, even poor Whites, as a result of Jim Crow rac-
ism,” and that the Brown Court also failed to impart “important lessons about not just white 
privilege but also the dehumanizing effects of racial segregation on Whites.”).  
111 National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).   
112 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOV-
ERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 64 (2017) (“Because the FHA’s appraisal standards included 
a whites-only requirement, racial segregation now became an official requirement of the federal 
mortgage insurance program. The FHA judged that properties would probably be too risky for 
insurance if they were in racially mixed neighborhoods or even in white neighborhoods near 
black ones that might possibly integrate in the future.”). 
113 See Fed. Hous. Admin., Underwriting Manual: Underwriting and Valuation Procedure until 
Title II of the National Housing Act, 937 (1938). 
114 Id. 
115 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 112, at 122 (noting that the government went to great lengths to 
create racial division such as “routing interstate highways to create racial boundaries or to shift 
the residential placement of African American families.”).  
116 SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY 22 (1999).  
117 Where Race Lives: Uncle Sam Lends a Hand, PBS (2003), 
https://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_06_a-godeeper.htm.   
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had been racialized as white.118 Because the language of the bill was 
race-neutral, anti-discrimination language was conveniently left out of 
it.119 Thus, race-neutral language was used to continue enforcing racist 
policies and practices. Similarly, the Social Security Act and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1935, excluded agricultural and domestic work-
ers, but did not explicitly name race.120 At the more than 70 percent of 
agricultural and domestic workers were Black.121 The lack of naming 
race specifically led to their exclusion.  
III. STAMPED: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF EUROCENTRIC 
BEAUTY NORMS ON TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE  
A. White is Right 
This history of socially and legally constructed race, including 
whiteness, and deeply entrenched anti-Blackness, brought us to where 
we are today. Because Black people have constantly been dehumanized, 
animalized, and undervalued, we have not been considered the default 
when it comes to professionalism and beauty—people who have been 
racialized as white are.122 This section discusses how white supremacy 
permeates ideas around what it means to appear as “professional” or 
“businesslike.” 
Under white supremacist systems, whiteness is “a yardstick for 
beauty[.]”123 Even Thomas Jefferson, one of our founding fathers, val-
ued and normalized long, straight, flowing hair.124 He described white, 
flowing hair as an “elegant symmetry of form,” while describing Black 
people as orangutans.125 Such a system only works when a group or 
 
118 Id. 
119 Adolph Reed Jr., The New Deal Wasn’t Intrinsically Racist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, (Nov. 26, 
2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/155704/new-deal-wasnt-intrinsically-racist.  
120 Larry DeWitt, The Decision to Exclude Agricultural and Domestic Workers from the 1935 
Social Security Act, 70 SOC. SEC. BULL. (2010), https://www.ssa.gov/pol-
icy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p49.html. 
121 See HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK, AND 
THE LAW 97 (1977) (noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not apply to agricultural and 
domestic labor, where more than seventy percent of black workers were concentrated). 
122 See Shelby Stewart, Study shows Black women with natural hair less likely to get jobs, 
Twitter reacts, CHRON. (Aug. 13, 2020, 3:16 PM), https://www.chron.com/ beauty/arti-
cle/Study-shows-Black-women-with-natural-hair-less-15482010.php. 
123 Kaili Moss, Black Hair(tage): Career Liability or Civil Rights Issue?, 25 WM. & MARY J. 
RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 191, 192 (2018). 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 193. 
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groups of people are relegated to the lowest rungs of society.126 White-
ness became beautiful and Blackness became ugly. In the 1700s, Black 
women in Louisiana were subject to Tignon Laws, which were ordi-
nances that required them to cover their hair to signal their enslave-
ment.127  
Given this historical context, Black people, for survival alone, 
have had to consistently move closer to a proximity to whiteness. That 
meant, if possible, having straight hair because, if you could never be 
white, at least you could have hair that reminded white people of white-
ness. Less kinky or straight hair theoretically pushed one closer to 
whiteness.128 The lighter one’s skin, the more acceptable that person 
would be in a white supremacist society.129 Black people have had to 
make these constrained choices due to surviving the horrors of slavery, 
the lynchings of the Jim Crow movement, or surviving enough to even-
tually build the same generational wealth this country has consistently 
robbed Black people of. 130 
When Black people tried to build generational wealth, it often 
came on the back of the white is beautiful ideal.131 Madame C.J. Walker 
 
126 See JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH, ON THE NATURAL VARIETY OF MANKIND 98–99 
(Thomas Bendyshe, 1969); THOMAS H. HUXLEY, On The Methods And Results Of Ethnology, in 
MAN’S PLACE IN NATURE AND OTHER ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSAYS 209, 244–45 (1896) (“Of all 
the odd myths that have arisen in the scientific world, the ‘Caucasian mystery,’ invented quite 
innocently by Blumenbach, is the oddest. A Georgian woman’s skull was the handsomest in his 
collection. Hence it became his model exemplar of human skulls, from which all others might 
be regarded as deviations; and out of this, by some strange intellectual hocus-pocus, grew up 
the notion that the Caucasian man is the prototypic ‘Adamic’ man.”). 
127 Jameelah Nasheed, A Brief History of Black Hair, Politics, and Discrimination, TEEN VO-
GUE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/a-brief-history-of-black-hair-politics-
and-discrimination#:~:text=In%20order%20to%20diminish%20%E2%80%9Cexces-
sive,slave%20class%20%E2%80%94%20despite%20the%20fact.  
128 See Shayna Watson, Black People Please Stop Saying Straightening Our Hair Is Appropri-
ation, THE ROOT (Oct. 22, 2016, 6:14 AM), https://www.theroot.com/black-people-please-stop-
saying-straightening-our-hair-1790857373 (“Even after slavery ended, black women who 
straightened their hair were seen as being more “well-adjusted” and had an easier time gaining 
employment from white employers than women who maintained their natural texture.”). 
129 Simpson, supra note 11, at 286. 
130 See Deborah A. Rosen, Slavery, Race, and Outlawry: The Concept of the Outlaw in Nine-
teenth-Century Abolitionist Rhetoric, 58 Am. J. Legal Hist. 126, 136 (2018) (detailing the con-
sequences enslaved Africans faced if they refused to conform to the demands of slavery-related 
laws); KENDI, supra note 42, at 273–74 (noting that lynchings spiked in the 1890s because Black 
people were resisting segregation); Anthony C. Thompson, Symposia: Stepping Up To The 
Challenge of Leadership on Race, 48 Hofstra L. Rev. 735, 736 (2020) (“Race cleaves the coun-
try into two competing visions of who is dangerous and who is not; who has power and who 
does not; who enjoys the benefits of generational wealth and who does not; who is entitled to 
voice and who is not.”).  
131 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895 
(2007) (describing how Black people have had to “accommodate” and downplay their Blackness 
as a means for survival and advancement in society.).  
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became this country’s first Black millionaire by selling other Black 
women hair products that would make their hair straighter.132 Madame 
C.J. Walker and other Black women clearly viewed their hair “as an 
indicator of [their] gender, social class, sexual orientation, political 
views, religion, and even age.”133 Today, many of the country’s leading 
Black hair companies, which are often owned white-owned, continue to 
profit off a society that degrades and devalues Black hair and Black 
bodies.134  
B. Black Resistance to Eurocentric Ideals 
Because of the normalization of whiteness and white standards 
as the norm for humanity, any acceptance or pride around the natural 
form and aesthetics of Black hair is an act of resistance against white 
supremacy and act of self-empowerment for Black people. This conclu-
sion is demonstrated by the fluid and transformative history of Black 
peoples’ acceptance, rejection, detachment, and linked relationship be-
tween Black people and our hair. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Black people began to push back against 
white beauty standards via the “Black is Beautiful” movement.135 For 
instance, the Black activist Angela Davis, wore an afro as a sign of 
Black power.136 Given her relationship with the Black Panther Party, 
however, Angela Davis and afros were quickly written off as being 
“militant.”137 The Black is Beautiful movement of the 1960s reaffirmed 
for Black people and for the broader white society, that whiteness, in-
cluding white skin, hair, and ideals, were not the gold standard, and that 
Black people loved themselves.138  
 
132 Mallory, Morgan Simone, ‘When the Sun of Cultural Beauty Rises, the Competent Mind 
Remains Resilient!’: The Journey of Title VII and the Story of Natural Hair, S. UNIV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
133 Randle, supra note 88, at 119. 
134 Seren Morris, From Shea Moisture to Carol’s Daughter, This List of Non-Black-Owned 
Hair Brands May Surprise You, NEWSWEEK (June 9, 2020, 11:42 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/list-non-black-hair-brands-shea-moisture-carols-daughter-
1509677.   
135 PAUL C. TAYLOR, BLACK IS BEAUTIFUL: A PHILOSOPHY OF BLACK AESTHETICS 16 (Wiley 
2016). 
136 Monica C. Bell, The Braiding Cases, Cultural Deference, and the Inadequate Protection of 
Black Women Consumers, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 125, 131 (2007). 
137 Kayla K. Jackson, Passively Black, Actively Unprofessional: Beyond a Fault-Based Con-
ception of Black Women’s Identity and Hairstyling in Title VII Jurisprudence (Mar. 20, 2019) 
(Honors Theses, Bates College) (on file with SCARAB: Digital Commons@Bates). 
138 See MAXINE LEEDS CRAIG, AIN’T I A BEAUTY QUEEN?: BLACK WOMEN, BEAUTY, AND THE 
POLITICS OF RACE 24 (2002) (explaining the emergence of the Black is Beautiful movement in 
the 1960s). 
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This was one of the first times that Black people, on a national 
scale, attempted to reconnect with their African heritage and culture.139 
This revolution led to a resurgence in representation for Black people in 
film. The 1960s produced films such as “Guess Who’s Coming to Din-
ner,” which occurred six months after the Supreme Court decided Lov-
ing v. Virginia.140 Black people began to be portrayed on television not 
as “the help,” but as Black professionals.141 Black journalists talked 
about race on talk shows.142 Black people danced and evoked Black joy 
on shows like Soul Train.143 As an excerpt from Alice Walker’s Living 
by the World articulates, Black people and our hair are both separate and 
one-in-the same:  
 
I realized I had never been given the opportunity 
to appreciate  hair for its true self. That it did, in 
fact, have one. I remembered years of  enduring 
hairdressers—from my mother onward—doing 
missionary work  on my hair. They dominated, 
suppressed, controlled. Now, more or less free,  
 it stood this way and that. I would call up my 
friends around the country to  report on its antics. 
It never thought of lying down. Flatness, the mis-
sionary  position, did not interest it. Being short, 
cropped off near the root, another  missionary 
“solution,” did not interest it either. It sought 
more and more  space, more light, more of itself. 
It loved to be washed; but that was it.144 
This intimate connection makes it such that Black people relate 
to our hair as a part of ourselves, but we also are forced to continuously 
take into account what our hair means to other people. Throughout our 
history, Black people have continued to resist hair-related oppression at 
every turn:  
 
 
139 Griffin, supra note 1. 
140 Kimberly Marcela Duron, Old v. New: Race and Relationships in ‘Guess Who’s Coming to 
Dinner’ and ‘The Big Sick’, FILM INDEP. (Sep. 29, 2017), https://www.filmindepen-
dent.org/blog/old-v-new-race-relationships-guess-whos-coming-dinner-big-sick/. 
141 See Black is Beautiful: The Emergence of Black Culture and Identity in the 60s and 70s, 
NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFR. AM. HIST. & CULTURE, https://nmaahc.si.edu/blog-post/black-beauti-
ful-emergence-black-culture-and-identity-60s-and-70s (discussing Diahann Carroll’s portrayal 
of a nurse, widow, and single mother in the comedy “Julia.”). 
142 Id.  
143 Id. 
144 Alice Walker, Oppressed Hair Puts a Ceiling on the Brain, in LIVING BY THE WORLD (1987). 
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1700 -  Black women slaves who worked in pro-
duce fields covered their hair to protect it from 
harsh conditions they were forced to work in.145 
Black women slaves who worked in slave master 
houses sometimes copied the hairstyles of the 
slave masters.146 
 
1960 - My Black is Beautiful sentiment spreads 
throughout the Black community; Black Panther 
Party claims the afro as part of their uniform.147 
 
2019 - First legislation passed in two states in the 
United States  making hair discrimination illegal 
as a part of race discrimination.148 
 
2020 - Certain appearances of Black natural hair 
are generally accepted, other  types and forms are 
still looked down upon.149 
Considering this timeline, and also considering the four-hundred 
plus years of oppression Black people faced and continue to face due to 
white supremacy, racism, and anti-Blackness, it is not difficult to imag-
ine that the remedies of the legal system have been inadequate to pro-
vide Black people protection or justice. 
C. Critical Race Theory, Intersectionality, and the Need for These 
Legal Theories  
Critical race theory developed from a group of legal scholars 
discussing the shortcomings of the American legal system in its attempts 
(or lack thereof) to address racial injustice150 established and perpetu-
ated by American institutions. “Critical race theory is a body of legal 
 
145 Griffin, supra note 1. 
146 Griffin, supra note 1. 
147 Griffin, supra note 1. 
148 Nasheed, supra note 127. 
149 See Tina Amo, Problems in the Workplace for Persons Who Wear Dreadlocks, CHRON (de-
tailing the problems people face when wearing dreadlocks), https://work.chron.com/problems-
workplace-persons-wear-dreadlocks-19400.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).  
150 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking back to Move 
Forward, 43 CONN L. REV. 1253, 1263–65 (2011). 
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scholarship, a majority of whose authors are both existentially people of 
color and ideologically committed to the struggle against racism, partic-
ularly as institutionalized in and by law.”151 Kimberle Crenshaw coined 
both intersectional legal theory intersectionality.152 Intersectionality is 
the understanding of identity categories and their significant intersection 
when people experience inequities.153 
As racism goes, it permeates many aspects of the lives of which 
it oppresses. Hair discrimination is a tentacle of racism and functions as 
such. The various cases of hair discrimination that have happened re-
cently and over history not only affect Black people psychologically, 
but also in a more immediate sense financially. Hair discrimination, and 
race discrimination generally of course, affects a person’s access to 
money, capital, and generational wealth.154 Job offers rescinded,155 sal-
ary increases denied, 156  and blocked educational opportunities 157  are 
only a few of the repercussions that Black people face because of hair 
discrimination.   
The legal structure in the United States utterly fails to account 
for racial equity in analysis and provision of legal remedies to litigants 
and affected parties. Given the history of this country and the demon-
ization of Black people in every conceivable way, recognition of this 
fact at least warrants a judicial analysis that considers the humanity and 
suffering of Black people.  
Regardless of courts’ reasoning that a specific hairstyle is not an 
“immutable characteristic,” the fact is that a white person in the same 
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2005). 
152 Jane Coaston, The Intersectionality Wars, VOX (May 28, 2019, 9:09 AM EDT), 
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/5/20/18542843/intersectionality-conservatism-law-
race-gender-discrimination. 
153 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989). 
154 See, e.g., Caitlin Mullen, Black Women’s Hair Choices Can Affect Their Job Chances, Study 
Says, BIZWOMEN (Aug. 24, 2020, 8:37 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/lat-
est-news/2020/08/black-womens-hair-choices-can-affect-their-job.html?page=all; see also Ta-
Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014) , https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ (describing the myriad of 
ways that racism has robbed Black people from generational wealth building).  
155 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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Lawsuit (Jan. 9, 2020), https://heidimacomber.com/2020/01/09/jackson-national-life-insur-
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scenario would not be penalized for the way in which they wore their 
hair naturally or otherwise. The counterargument that a white person 
wearing their hair in a generally unacceptable way, such as a bright or-
ange mohawk in a conservative workplace, does not mirror the ordinary 
Black person’s experience with hair discrimination. When Black people 
push back against these prevailing norms, whiteness is weaponized 
against them.158 
D. Backlash: Rogers v. Am. Airlines 
Critical race theorists, like Kimberlé Crenshaw, have argued that 
Title VII’s categorical framework benefits white women and Black 
men, often at the exclusion of Black women.159 Given the courts’ con-
fusion about intersectionality and claims that involve both race and gen-
der-based discrimination, Black women often get the short end of the 
stick when it comes to grooming cases.160  
Renee Rodgers, an American Airlines employee, wore her hair 
to work in cornrows.161 In the same ways that Black codes were histori-
cally used to reign in Black behavior and expression, American Airlines 
implemented a grooming policy that banned braided hairstyles.162 Rodg-
ers argued that American Airlines’ race neutral policy constituted race 
and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.163 Rodgers attempted to 
bring an intersectionality claim, arguing that the policy uniquely dis-
criminated against Black women.164 Rodgers asserted that American 
Airlines’ policy was just like bans on afros, because braids also had his-
torical and cultural significance to Black women.165 
 
158 Aysa Gray, The Bias of ‘Professionalism’ Standards, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.: HU-
MAN RTS. (June 4, 2019), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_bias_of_professionalism_standards. 
159 Yvette N. A. Pappoe, The Shortcomings of Title VII for the Black Female Plaintiff, 22 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 8 (2019). 
160 Michelle L. Turner, The Braided Uproar: A Defense of My Sister’s Hair and a Contempo-
rary Indictment of Rogers v. American Airlines, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 134 (2001) 
(“Black men (unlike Black women) have been able to successfully litigate hair-grooming poli-
cies as racially discriminatory.”). 
161 The plaintiff’s last name is actually Rodgers but is referred in the official case as Rogers. 
See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v. Am. Air-
lines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571, 575 n.12 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2008). 
162 Id. at 576.  
163 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
164 Caldwell, supra note 161, at 573. 
165 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231–32. 
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The Rogers court disagreed.166 The court grounded its analysis 
in the immutability doctrine and held that to find braids immutable, it 
needed evidence that Black people predominantly or exclusively wore 
braids.167 As evidence that Black people did not exclusively wear braids, 
the court looked to the fact that Bo Derrek, a white actress, wore corn-
rows in the movie “10.”168 The court reasoned that Bo Derrek, not Black 
culture, popularized cornrows.169 Because Rodgers’ braids were the re-
sult of synthetic hair extensions, the court found that her cornrows were 
an “easily changeable artifice.”170 
Had the court grounded its analysis in the socio-historical con-
text detailed in Part II,171 it would have realized two things. Firstly, its 
analysis that Bo Derrek popularized cornrows served, yet again, to hold 
Black hair to a white, Eurocentric standard. Secondly, that race is not an 
immutable characteristic, but has shifted over time given social and le-
gal norms. Such an understanding would have enabled the court to as-
certain that it is prevailing racial stereotypes and biases about Black hair 
that are “immutable,” not Black hair or race itself. Courts’ reluctance to 
do the painstaking work of incorporating a socio-historical and intersec-
tional lens into its legal analysis creates a double-edged sword for Black 
people in the workplace. On one hand, Black people can manipulate 
their hair to comply with an employer’s standards, or they can forego 
the risk of Title VII’s protections, depending on whether they have af-
ros, braids, locs, or twists. Working through a socio-historical and legal 
analysis of the development of race would render the immutability doc-
trine a “legal fiction.”172   
The immutability doctrine is a “legal fiction” because is not 
based in fact, but has very real consequences for Black people challeng-
ing discrimination in the workplace.173 Under the immutability standard, 
 
166 Id. at 232 (“An all-braided hair style is an ‘easily changed characteristic,’ and, even if soci-
oculturally associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for 
distinctions in the application of employment practices by an employer.”).  




171 See supra Part II.  
172 D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against 
Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIA. L. 
REV. 987, 1029 (2017) (“Strict immutability, therefore, serves as a “legal fiction”: a rule created 
by judicial, legislative, and political bodies, which is not based in fact, yet is treated as such in 
legitimating zones of protection and inclusion.”). 
173 Id. at 1029–30.  
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as evidenced in Rogers, employers can and do consider applicant’s ap-
pearances when making hiring decisions.174 This puts Black people in a 
bind, especially when it comes to their hair. If a Black woman with locs 
walks into an interview and is told she must either take her locs down 
or get rid of them altogether, she is faced with a hard choice: risk unem-
ployment or risk putting her hair into a style that will damage the fine 
structure of her hair.175 Current Title VII law does not accommodate for 
the millions that Black women spend annually on making sure that they 
are read as “professional.”176 Nor does Title VII law take into account 
the socio-historical context that brought us to this place. Instead, the 
courts rely on the legal fiction of immutability and on race neutrality, to 
twist Black people in the workplace.  
IV. SOLUTIONS: A WAY OUT 
A. A New Legal Standard 
As this Article has demonstrated, race is a social177 and legal178 
construct. In addition, race neutral laws in this country, like the G.I. Bill 
or the Social Security Act, have often had a deleterious impact on Black 
people—often preventing them from accessing the benefits of these 
laws altogether.179 The same impact occurs when courts require race 
neutral grooming codes which, in effect, disproportionately burden 
 
174 See Rogers, supra note 163, at 232. 
175 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Un-
der Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1112–20 (2010) (documenting the ways in which relaxers, hair 
extensions, and wigs can damage Black women’s hair and scalps); see also Simpson, supra note 
11, at 276–78. 
176 Moss, supra note 123, at 202–03 (proposing that one of the reasons the black hair care 
industry is worth nearly $500 billion is because black women are often compelled to alter their 
natural hair or wear false hair in order to comply with workplace grooming policies that “track 
normative standards of appearance,” or otherwise risk exclusion from the workplace for decid-
ing to wear their hair in its natural, unaltered texture). 
177 Moss, supra note 123, at 208 (“[T]he scientific community would generally agree that ‘race 
is a social construct without biological meaning.’”) (quoting Megan Gannon, Race is a Social 
Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ar-
ticle/race-is-a-social-construct-scientists-argue).  
178 See, e.g., IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 7–14 
(2006) (documenting the legal construction of race in the United States).  
179 Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: How the History of the G.I. Bill and Other Inconven-
ient Truths Undermine the Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 75 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 583 (2014) (“In the design and implementation of the G.I. Bill, the federal government 
explicitly encouraged residential segregation and discrimination against [B]lacks.”).  
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Black people.180 The courts’ reliance on immutability, which flies in the 
face of what we know to be true about race, compounds this burden.181  
Courts should remove the immutability standard from Title VII 
jurisprudence. Numerous scholars have argued that the immutability 
doctrine is a legal fiction that is rooted in discredited views of race.182 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) advanced 
a similar argument in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, an-
other hair discrimination case.183 In that case, the EEOC urged the court 
to embed an understanding of the socio-historical treatment of hair into 
its understanding of race.184 The court refused to adopt a socio-historical 
analysis of race, because doing so would lead to “absurd results” be-
cause white and Black employees who wore locs would be able to chal-
lenge the employer’s grooming policy.185  
Relying on the immutability doctrine, the court found that the 
employer’s race-neutral grooming policy “could not be race-based if in-
dividuals who did not share the same racial identity can be subject to its 
enforcement.”186 The court also found that “Title VII does not protect 
against discrimination based on traits, even a trait that has sociocultural 
racial significance.”187 As Wendy Greene argued, the court treated afros 
as legally protected textures and anything else as legally unprotected 
hairstyles, leading it to “literally split hairs to preserve four decades of 
legal precedent protecting the former.”188  
When the case reached the Eleventh Circuit, the panel engaged 
in an analysis of what race was.189 Despite coming to the conclusion that 
scholarly arguments about the social construction of race were persua-
sive, the panel decided that the definition of race in 1964 would be their 
 
180 See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 175 (discussing how facially neutral grooming codes 
disproportionately burden Black women).  
181 Greene, supra note 172, at 1029 (“Strict immutability, therefore, serves as a “legal fiction”: 
a rule created by judicial, legislative, and political bodies, which is not based in fact, yet is 
treated as such in legitimating zones of protection and inclusion.”). 
182 Greene, supra note 172, at 1009. 
183 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant Motion to Dismiss at 8, EEOC v. Catastrophe 
Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (No. 13-cv-00476-CB-M). 
184 Id. at 10. 
185 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 (S.D. Ala. 2014).  
186 See Greene, supra note 172, at 1015 (citing Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d at 
1143–44). 
187 Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d. at 1144. 
188 Greene, supra note 172, at 1017. 
189 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156, 1164–67 (11th Cir. 2016), withdrawn 
and superseded by, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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North Star.190 The panel, like the district court, found that afros were a 
black hair texture, while locs were a black hairstyle.191  
Title VII does not strictly address immutability. However, courts 
borrowed immutability concepts from cases such as Willingham v. Ma-
con Telephone Publishing Company, to shape their reading of Title 
VII.192  This is disastrous for Black litigants, especially because our 
courts played a central role in the legal construction of race.193 Accord-
ing to Wendy Greene, the leading expert on grooming codes cases, the 
immutability doctrine is at odds with Title VII’s statutory language and 
evidentiary burdens.194 Scholars have argued that courts should adopt an 
expansive reading of immutability akin to that in sexual orientation 
cases.195 In those cases, courts have traditionally read immutability as 
including characteristics that are “central and fundamental” to one’s 
identity.196  
We would take that analysis one step further. On June 15, 2020, 
the Supreme Court held that Title VII protects employees against dis-
crimination based on sexual stereotypes about sexual orientation or gen-
der identity in Bostock v. Clayton County.197 The Court held that dis-
crimination based on sexual stereotypes constitutes discrimination be-
cause of sex and thus violates Title VII.198 Courts should retire the im-
mutability requirement and replace it with a new standard—that Title 
VII protects Black people who were terminated because of racial stere-
otypes about their hair, including whether or not their hair is profes-
sional, or racial stereotypes rooted in what constitutes professional or 
business-like hair. Such a standard would side-step the legal fiction of 
the immutability requirement, and would bring locs, braids, twists, and 
 
190 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026–28 (11th Cir. 2016). 
191 Id. at 1030. 
192 See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975); see also 
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tions about the scope of statutory prohibitions on discrimination”). 
193 See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922) (holding that white means 
Caucasian people); see also United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 211, 214–15 (1923) (using 
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195 See generally Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Appellants at 12–13, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 14-13482). 
196 Id. at 13. 
197 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020). 
198 Id. at 1754. 
ROBINSON & ROBINSON  
288 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 20:2 
other culturally and historically Black hairstyles within Title VII’s pro-
tection.199  
CONCLUSION 
Although our courts have attempted to define race so that Black 
people can be afforded Title VII’s protections, they have woefully 
failed. Though racial discrimination in the workplace has reduced, 
courts’ reluctance to retire the immutability standard and having a 
meaningful reckoning about race continues to harm Black people eco-
nomically and legally. Because courts lack a clear definition for race, 
they continue to make arbitrary distinctions between hair that is mutable 
versus hair that is not. Courts should infuse a socio-historical and inter-
sectional lens into their legal analysis because without it, Black litigants 
bringing hair discrimination claims will be trapped between a loc and a 
hard place.  
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